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Recently the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) directed
that all DOD industrially funded activities bill their customers on the
basis of stabilized rates. Industrially- funded R£D activities are in-
cluded in the policy change.
The writers address the subject of stabilized rates at R$D activities.
The writers (1) identify the policy change, (2) trace its emergence in
the DOD organization and (3) assess potential impacts.
The writers conclude that stabilized rates are more appropriate for
non-R§D activities than for R§D activities. However, stabilized rates
are workable in the R§D environment as long as it is recognized that the
R§D workload is essentially a level-of-effort concept, and as long as
minimal adjustments to locally established rates are made at higher levels
Sources of information included official correspondence and interviews
at selected Navy Laboratories and other NIF activities.
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I. RESEARCH PROBLEM
Government in-house laboratories provide a significant
portion of the research and development capability in the
United States. In Fiscal Year 1971, in-house laboratories
accounted for over four billion dollars or about twenty-five
percent of all Federal R&D appropriations for that year.
Department of Defense in-house laboratories accounted for
about two billion dollars or one-half of the in-house effort.
[Ref. 1, pp. 13, 14] The volume of funding alone clearly
attaches critical importance to the quality of in-house lab-
oratory management. The key nature of military research and
development as a determinant of tomorrow's defense posture
expands the importance beyond relative dollar magnitudes.
This thesis addresses itself to the subject of stabilized
rates at the Navy in-house laboratories. The phrase "stabil-
ized rates" refers to fixed billing rates, representing a
change in the way laboratories and other industrially-funded
government activities price their services. In examining
the new policy, this thesis will attempt to (1) explain why
the change occurred, (2) how it works, and (3) how it will
affect laboratory management.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
Over the last several years, the concept of stabilized
rates has steadily gained impetus as a desirable intra-
governmental transfer pricing technique. Under this concept,
8

government industrial-type operations such as Public Works
Centers employ fixed, pre-published prices in billing their
customers.
Official support for this policy became visible in 1974
and resulted in a series of directives and position papers
from various government agencies. The evolution of the policy
is described in Chapter III of this thesis. By 1975, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) promulgated a
mandate that POD laboratories operating within service
industrial funds would bill their sponsors on the basis of
predetermined rates, fixed on an annual basis and published
in advance .
The mandate requires a basic change in customer billing
by the laboratories. This might properly be considered a
change in the method of intra-governmental transfer pricing.
The output of Navy laboratories is research or technology
development at the highly uncertain front-end of a weapons
system acquisition cycle, rather than standardized products
or services. Therefore, Navy Laboratories bill their customers
on the basis of inputs (resources used) rather than outputs.
The customer is most often paying for a best effort versus
a product.
Prior to stabilized rates, the customer was always billed
on the basis of actual costs plus allocated overhead. The
policy change, which is the subject of this thesis, modifies
the billing basis so that the customer will be billed actual
direct labor hours times predetermined fixed rates.

As required by industrial fund accounting, the stabilized
rate includes an acceleration (a percentage charge) of the
basic labor rate to provide payroll benefits and overhead.
A comparison of the basis for establishing rate factors be-
tween the prior method and the method under stabilized rates
is shown in Figure A.
Let T = total charge for one effort
H = actual hours worked
D = hourly rate for direct labor
= total overhead rate (G&A and indirect)
k = acceleration of direct labor for payroll benefits
Customers are charged for labor and overhead on the basis of
the following formula:
T = H(D + k D +0)
r r
The components of the customer bill compare as follows
:
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It is not correct to characterize stabilized rates as
falling in the category of either firm fixed prices or standard
cost. The price charged a customer is based upon actual labor
times a fixed rate. No standard cost concepts are involved as
the policy relates to pricing not costing. There is no "should
cost" rationale underlying the setting of the rates.
In summary, the stabilized rate policy being required by
ASD(G) differs from existing practices as follows:
1. Rates must be published in advance whereas no such
requirement has historically existed.
2. The rate is fixed in the aggregate whereas the histor-
ical rate was made up of actual direct costs and
adjustable allocated costs.




This is a problem oriented thesis. Even as stabilized
labor rates are being implemented at Navy Laboratories, there
are substantive issues to be resolved. Stabilized rates are
still evolving. There is wide-spread concern among laboratory
managers about possible consequences of implementing stabilized
rates.
The objective of this thesis is, so far as possible, to
assess the impact of stabilized rates . This can be organized
into three segments as follows:
1. The impact of stabilized rates on the integrity of
the Navy Industrial Fund.
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2. The impact of stabilized rates on the management of
Navy Laboratories.
3. The impact of stabilized rates on the weapons system
acquisition process.
C. APPROACH
The evolutionary character of stabilized rates in labora-
tories has, more than any other factor , shaped the approach
employed herein. As a problem-oriented thesis, this effort
looks at a policy currently being implemented at field
activities. All industrially funded Navy Laboratories con-
verted to stabilized rates for Fiscal Year 1977, beginning
1 October 1976. An interesting and perhaps key aspect of
stabilized rates is that significant portions of the working
mechanisms are evolving even as implementation occurs. As
a case study, stabilized rates differ from the stereotype
version of policy implementation where policy changes are
carefully planned in great detail prior to implementation.
No value judgements are rendered here as to whether the con-
currence of policy evolution and implementation should be
regarded as good or bad.
The ultimate impact of stabilized rates is considered
to depend upon details yet to be completely evolved. How •
stabilized rates are administered may have more to do with
the ultimate verdict than the fact of stabilization itself.
A case study approach has been selected as the most useful
format for this problem. Methodologically the subject is
approached in the following five steps:
12

1. The Navy Laboratories and the environment in which
they operate is described to provide a backdrop for
the problem area.
2. A chronology of events to date is presented.
3. The basic and secondary issues are identified.
4. Probable impact is assessed noting that the impact
will depend on details not yet worked out.
5. Since this is a problem thesis, certain recommenda-
tions are included for possible reading by individuals
in the problem-solving arena. The purpose of the
recommendations is usefulness and they are intended
to assist potential readers in constructing a logical
basis for making decisions.
The Navy Laboratories and the Navy Industrial Fund Accounting
System (NIF) is briefly described in Chapter II. This is in-
tended to provide the backdrop to the problem. Neither the
description of the laboratories nor NIF accounting is intended
to be exhaustive. The description focuses on what operates
upon or is likely to be affected by the specific change being
studied.
A review of the correspondence and interviews pertaining
to rate stabilization are contained in Chapter III. Infor-
mation was sought based upon case-study methodology. The
information search was conducted as follows:
1. Search of relevant publications, periodicals, and
unpublished material.
2. Official correspondence and position papers dealing
with the issue of stabilized rates.
13

3. In-depth interviews at selected Navy, industrially-
funded R&D Laboratories.
4. In-depth interviews at selected non-R&D Navy activities
which are industrially funded.
5. Interviews with headquarters personnel involved in
implementation
.
The chronology of events to date is included as a logical
part of the information presented in Chapter III.
Chapter IV contains the analysis of the stabilized rate
policy. It identifies the primary and secondary issues in-
volved including those which are unresolved. Secondly, it
assesses the probable impact on the Navy Laboratories and
the weapons acquisition process which Navy Laboratories
largely exist to support. Uncertainty of outcome, expecially
with regard to policy details yet unresolved, becomes a major
limiting factor in assessing impact.
The fifth and final chapter contains recommendations.
The management objectives upon which the recommendations





The Navy Laboratories with which this thesis is concerned
are the ones which report to the Chief of Naval Material and
the Naval Research Laboratory under the Chief of Naval Research
Currently eight such laboratories exist. Appendix A lists the
laboratories by name and location and provides a brief summary
of the assigned mission. Appendix B lists the civilian ceil-
ings and total dollar volume for fiscal year 19 73. The cash
allocation (Corpus) is shown, if known, and the fiscal year
1976 dollar volume is shown for the laboratories where inter-
views were conducted. The mission of each laboratory is to
be the principal Navy research, development, test and evalu-
ation center for its area of expertise as described in
Appendix A. The laboratories have historically provided the
Navy with an in-house capability of complementing and moni-
toring the R&D effort provided by private industry. In some
cases the laboratories have expertise which is not available
in the private sector [Ref . 29]
.
The remainder of chapter two provides a brief outline of
the establishment and operations of the Navy Industrial Fund
(NIF) . The assumption is made that the readers are familiar
with the NIF system.
15

B. NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND
Industrial funds were established to provide a means of
financing the operations at those activities which provide
industrial or commercial-type services or products. The Navy
Industrial Fund was established under the provisions of 10
U. S. Code 2208 which authorized the Secretary of Defense to
establish working capital funds and prescribe regulations
governing the operations of the industrial fund activities
[Ref. 21.
The regulations which govern the operations and accounting
procedures of the industrial fund activities begin with DOD
Directive 7410.4 [Ref. 3] and are further refined in the
Navy Comptroller Manual [Ref. 4] . The specific accounting
procedures for the RDT&E activities are contained in the Navy
Industrial Fund Handbook, NAVSO P-3045 [Ref. 5].
The primary advantages of the industrial-commercial
activity have been described as providing:
1. More effective means of determining costs for goods
and services as a basis for billing customers.
2. More effective and flexible means for financing,
budgeting, and accounting for operations.
3. Greater sense of responsibility and restraint in the
ordering of goods and services based upon availability
of funds.




5. A more complete consumption-type budget and account-
ing structure by which costs of goods and services
furnished may be budgeted and accounted for under the
program or function for which they have an end use
[Ref . 6, p. 206] .
The financial size and diversity of the NIF as a whole
represents a significant industrial complex. Total NIF
revenues for fiscal year 1976 were approximately $6.0 billion
while total Navy net expenditures were approximately $29
billion. In terms of diversification the NIF includes ship-
yards, printing stations, ordnance plants, aircraft overhaul
and repair facilities, public works centers, RDT&E activities,
Naval weapons facilities and ammunition depots, Polaris mis-
sile facilities, and the Military Sealift Command [Ref. 7,
p. 1-1].
1. Trends of RDT&E Laboratories
For the past several years there has been a trend
toward reducing the total number of laboratories through
consolidation. Laboratories in New London, Connecticut and
Newport, Rhode Island were combined to form the Naval Under-
water Systems Center (NUSC) . In 196 8, Naval Ordnance Test
Station (NOTS)-, China Lake, absorbed the Fuse Laboratory,
Corona, California, and emerged as the Naval Weapons Center.
In 1975, the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Maryland,
administratively combined with the Naval Weapons Laboratory,
Dahlgren, Virginia and is now called the Naval Surface War-
fare Center. This consolidation represents a 25% reduction
17

in the total number of laboratories which report to the Chief
of Naval Material and a significant increase in the centrali-
zation of control.
There has been an apparent trend by the laboratories
to increase the amount of work contracted out to private
industry. This has been brought about by a desire to avoid
competing with the private sector and because of increasing
workloads without a corresponding increase in civilian per-
sonnel ceilings [Ref. 29]. As examples, in fiscal year
1976 direct contracts represented 30% of the Naval Weapons
Center operating budget and 33.4% of the Naval Undersea
Center operating budget. The customers of the NIF laboratories
have historically paid the actual cost of direct contracts
and will continue to do so in the future.
2. Operation of NIF at Laboratories
Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) accounting is a system
of commercial accounting techniques adapted to the special
requirements of the Federal government. NIF activities
employ the double-entry bookkeeping methods and maintain a
chart of accounts. The annual operating results are summar-
ized in the conventional accounting format, a balance sheet,
and an income statement. However, a NIF balance sheet can-
not be interpreted in the same fashion as the balance sheet
of a private firm. The most glaring difference is the
absence of long-term capital assets on NIF balance sheets
and the omission of depreciation expense on income statements.
However, despite the deviations from private accounting, NIF
18

accounting has more of the aura and substance of commercial
accounting than government activities funded on an allotment
or operating budget basis.
A detailed description of NIF accounting is avoided
in this thesis on the assumption that most readers are al-
ready familiar with industrial fund concepts. The functional
review which follows is included as a prelude to discussions
in subsequent chapters.
Functionally, an industrial fund can be explained in







Each chartered NIF activity is assigned a revolving
fund or "corpus." Payment of operating expenses depletes the
corpus. It is restored by billing government customers or
sponsors on the basis of costs incurred. An activity corpus
is really part of the aggregate NIF corpus. The size of the
corpus depends on the pattern of outflows and inflows and
operating profits or losses constitute net increases or de-
creases. However, just as a corporation may skim-off divi-
sional profits and, if necessary, restore divisional losses,




NIF activities perform services and generate
products for their customers or sponsors on the basis of
reimbursable orders. These orders take the form of work
requests or project orders depending upon which is appropriate
Work requests are used for normal recurring effort and expire
at the end of the fiscal year. Project orders are used in
project-oriented tasks and possess more flexibility to last
beyond the end of the fiscal year. Work requests and project
orders perform two important functions:
1. Authorize NIF activities to begin work with dollar
limitation specified.
2. Provide a basis for sponsor billing.
In the area of funding, business practices yield
to the imperatives of the appropriation cycle. Normally,
the work is on-going; however, most appropriations are on a
year-by-year basis. Therefore, much accounting effort is
spent on the year-end hurdle of closing out one year's
authorizations and establishing new ones. NIF accounting is
characterized by a year-end climax to a much greater degree
than is the case in private industry.
c. Costs
Direct costs are recorded under a job order iden-
tifying the customer. Costs are paid by debiting the corpus
balance maintained in Washington. Whenever possible the
payment function has been centralized at Naval Regional
Finance Centers. NIF activities make only those types of
20

disbursements which the Navy has not found practical to
centralize.
d. Overhead
In the area of overhead control, NIF activities
most closely approximate private industry. In Navy labora-
tories, overhead, both indirect and GSA, is allocated on the
basis of direct labor hours. Prior to stabilized rates, over
or under absorption of overhead accounted for the net changes
(profits or losses) to the corpus. The integrity of the
corpus required good control of overhead rates. With the
advent of stabilized rates, there are more ways to cause net
changes to the corpus
.
e. Sponsor Billing
When work authorized in a Project Order or Work
Request has been accomplished, the NIF activity bills the
sponsor. On the basis of this billing done on DD Form 1080,
the Navy Finance office debits the NIF corpus and credits
the sponsors. NIF laboratories bill for and receive progress
payments. A project need not be complete to receive these
payments; however, the costs must have been incurred. In
billing, two rules must be followed or a criminal liability
exists. The two possible statutory violations are as follows:
1. R.S. 3678 - Work must conform to the wording of the
appropriation cited in the reimbursable order [Ref. 8]





If a NIF activity is performing a task for a sponsor and
incurred costs exceed the authorized funding, it is a violation
to bill the customer for the excessive incurred costs. The
only legal, though highly undesirable way that the NIF activity
can account for the overage is by charging it. to overhead.
The heart of the laboratory planning process lies
in forecasting the level of work and matching it with the
resources available. At a program level, the laboratories
compete with in-house and commercial competition to obtain
as much work as possible. Business acquired at the program
level is totaled to determine how closely projected business
matches available resources at the aggregate level. The
following questions are involved:
1. Size of total work force.
2. Availability of certain critical skills.
3. Availability of items requiring capital authorization
such as laboratories and test equipment.
4. Appropriate sizing of support or overhead functions.
At a local level the budget cycle is basically
a two year cycle—the planning phase and the execution phase.
In the planning phase, the estimates of total business (funding)
become more precise as the beginning of the execution year
approaches.
Laboratory planning results in the publication
of the Operating Budget and the A-ll Budget. The Operating
Budget formalizes planning data in a manner most meaningful
to the laboratories. It is regarded as an intra-Navy
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document. The A-ll budget derives its name from OMB Circular
A-ll. It is based upon the same data as the Operating Budget.
However, the line items are changed in certain exhibits to
conform to OMB and Congressional formats.
Theoretically, laboratories could operate on a
flexible budget system, sizing resources to fit business.
Increasingly, however, a reverse situation prevails. Labor-
atories accept as much work as their personnel and plant
permits. The Federal government sets personnel ceilings,
and the building and equipment budgets. When projected work
exceeds these limitations, the laboratories turn to contracting
activity. When projected work drops off, contracting dimin-
ishes and fixed costs drive up overhead rates.
23

III. BACKGROUND OF RATE STABILIZATION; CORRESPONDENCE AND
INTERVIEWS
A. INTRODUCTION
Initial guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), ASD(C), indicated that rate stabilization at
all DOD industrial fund activities would be implemented during
fiscal year 1976 (FY 76) beginning 1 July 1975. This chapter
will present a summary of the correspondence which flowed
between the Navy Research and Development Laboratories, the
Chief of Naval Material (CNM) and ASD(C). The results of
interviews which were conducted at both R&D and non-R&D facil-
ities on this subject are presented as the second part of this
chapter.
B. ELEMENTS OF RATE STABILIZATION
The primary justification for rate stabilization has been
to give customers of NIF activities a firm price for goods
and services. The prices when established would not change
during an entire fiscal year. By ASD(C) memo to the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (FM) dated 4 August 1975, the essential
elements of rate stabilization were explained as follows:
..^..Rate stabilization means that each activity
will establish a set of fixed rates based on its
approved budget. The rates will be used to bill
all customers for the goods and services they
receive from July 1, 1975, thru September 30,
19 76. The rates may be expressed as costs per:
manhour; manday; unit of outout; unit of input;
or any other manner which best suits the nature
of the effort. An activity may have as many
rates as is warranted by its organizational
24

structure and by its diversity of workload.
The rates will encompass all overhead costs,
labor acceleration, direct labor and direct
materials. . .A waiver of the requirement to
include direct materials in the rate structure
may be requested if material usage is both
unpredictable and not adaptable to the type
of standard pricing techniques now employed
by Defense stock funds... Fund activities which
do not now have a rate structure should begin
immediately to set-up such a system and to
adjust their charges to customers accordingly.
If conversion of ADP systems is a delaying
factor, bills should be prepared by hand until
the new ADP programs are put into operation.
[Ref. 16]
An enclosure to the above memo waived the requirement to
establish rates for direct material at research laboratories.
However the laboratories were to be encouraged to set rates
for direct materials whenever practical.
A letter from CNM to the Navy Laboratories dated 2 Septem-
ber 1975, told of discussions between ASN(R&D) and ASN(FM)
which resulted in a request to OSD to exempt the NIF commun-
ity from rate stabilization. The earliest date for implemen-
tation was extended by this letter to 1 October 19 75 rather
than 1 July 1975, and stabilized rates for direct labor were
extended until the fourth quarter of FY 76 at the earliest.
The NIF R&D activities were advised to review the rates
currently being used to determine their validity for the
balance of the fiscal year. The addressees were cautioned
"not to build-in a margin of error since a large operating
gain or loss, without adequate justification, will be viewed




1. Arguments Against Rate Stabilization
After the announcement by DOD that all industrially
funded activities would establish fixed rates, the managers
of the NIF R&D activities argued very strongly against the
idea. The Navy's argument to have NIF R&D activities exempted
from rate stabilization was that the work performed by NIF
R&D laboratories was primarily one-time type of work performed
almost exclusively in the past on a cost reimbursable basis,
and virtually no fixed-price or repetitive work had been
performed. Direct costs which were charged to projects and
billed against the sponsor's funds were the actual costs of
the work performed, whether the job required a GS-14 PhD
effort or a GS-7 technician effort. Overhead rates were
currently applied at an estimated fixed cost per direct labor
hour with periodic insignificant adjustments to insure a
break-even operation.
If standard rates were to be established and based
on a cost center average, the projects requiring low cost
talent would bear too much of the overhead load and the pro-
jects requiring high cost talent would not bear their fair
share of the load. In neither case would the actual cost
of the project be reflected in the billing process.
Prior to the concept of stabilized rates, planning
and budgeting estimates for R&D projects were negotiated
between the laboratories and the project sponsors with the
scope of work (performance envelope and time frame) being
agreed upon, rather than manning levels or composition of
26

work force. Variances which occurred were usually due to
changes in the scope of work rather than changes in labor or
overhead rates. The mechanisms for technical and financial
feedback to the customer included: (1) monthly financial
status reports to the customer on all research work performed;
(2) regular technical reports to program managers; and (3)
quarterly and semi-annual operating budget and financial
statements to NAVCOMPT and activity managers that indicate
all variances in budgeted overhead, G&A rates, and all costs.
If there were significant cost increases on a project the
customer was aware of this and had the option of providing
additional funds or reducing the scope of the effort. A
change to stabilized rates would end this smooth-running
method of operation.
In addition to the other arguments, it was estimated
that five or six months would be required to change existing
computer programs and develop new programs which would be
necessary for the new rate structure. There would be a con-
siderable cost involved in establishing the rate structure
and once in operation it would be a permanent additional cost,
since the present cost control system was not to be discarded.
The implementation of stabilized rates would permanently in-
crease the general and administrative (G&A) overhead rates
with no commensurate benefit derived for the managers of the
R&D activities. [Ref. 17]
2. Response to Arguments
The arguments against rate stabilization were presented
to ASD(C) during the months of August and September 1975. In
27

a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (FM)
,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C) stated that he felt
that the authority for final approval of within-year rate
changes should remain within his office and that there was
no basis for granting the R&D laboratories an exemption to
the DOD policy. ASD(C) emphasized that rates would remain
fixed throughout the year unless continuing losses threatened
the viability of the fund as a whole. If unanticipated
losses could not be absorbed by the fund, the full range of
financial options would have to be reviewed before a decision
could be made to change the rates. One option would be to
transfer cash between revolving funds.
ASD(C) further explained that an exemption did not
appear warranted because:
The nature of the lab effort does lend itself to
rates based on manhours of effort without sig-
nificant distortions of cost; financial manage-
ment of the activities would be improved;
industrially funded laboratories in the Army
have neither sought nor been given an exemption;
and the Navy's budget submission for FY 19 77
already included $98 million for rate stabili-
zation in the Research and Development labs.
[Ref. 18]
Expanding upon the above points, ASD(C) stated:
The laboratories are not unlike many organi-
zations within the industrial fund whose out-
put is a service, not a product... It is
recognized that Research and Development labs
have a wide range of salaried employees, but
our policy allows the flexibility needed to
reduce these distortions to insignificant
amounts. For instance, separate rates could
be established for clerical, technical, and
scientific manhours within a cost center or
division. . .Stabilized rates will improve
financial management by placing the long-
range financial planning of the laboratories
28

on an equal footing with its customers. Another
benefit is the ability to plan customer projects
based on known rates rather than estimates...
Finally, the budget request for the RDT&E Navy
appropriation in FY 1977 contains $98 million
for the implementation of rate stabilization.
The Navy cannot justify this amount unless the
rates are actually fixed.
Therefore, it is in the best interests of the
Department of Defense and the Navy to require
the policy of rate stabilization to be imple-
mented by the Research and Development labs.
I would expect the implementation to begin no
later than January 1976. [Ref. 18]
In response to the memorandum which denied exemption
to the NIF R&D activities, the Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy (R&D) prepared a rebuttal paper which was
largely a reiteration of the previously presented arguments
against rate stabilization. A summary of the points are as
follows:
1. The use of rates based on manhours of effort
can lead to significant distortions of cost
in the laboratories. In the case of material
and contract services this has been recognized
and waivers have already been granted...
2. No real benefit can be perceived from such
a billing system over the use of actual
labor costs which are readily available
from the cost accounting system. There is
no apparent reason to believe that financial
management of the laboratories will be im-
proved through the use of stabilized rates...
3. The $98 million was included in the Navy
budget as an add-on in accordance with
OSD(C) guidance and may be deleted if
exemption is made for the R&D NIF activi-
ties. I... again request that RDT&E NIF
activities be exempted from implementation
of rate stabilization. [Ref. 19]
3. The Final Decision
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)




. . .As you know, the Senate Appropriation Committee
has questioned the inclusion of some activities
under the industrial fund umbrella. An exemption
to R&D activities may raise the question as to
whether or not the R&D activities should be in-
cluded in the industrial fund. Our conclusion
at this time is that they should and although
we recognize that there may be some problems
in implementation, they frankly do not, in our
opinion warrant exclusion from this new policy.
While the gains to R&D activities from this
policy may not be as significant as with other
activities, we have not discerned that there
would be any disadvantages from their partici-
pation. Certainly, the R&D customers should
benefit from this policy. I should emphasize
that our policy does not contemplate changing
the cost systems at any of the activities.
It is only the billing to the customers that
is af fected. . .
.
[Ref . 20]
Following the ASD(C) denial of exemption to the NIF
R&D activities the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) issued
directions to the CNM laboratories to prepare for rate stabil-
ization. The laboratories were to stabilize all FY 76 over-
head rates (General and Direct Cost Center Indirect) and the
acceleration rate as of 1 January 1976. This letter also
stated that the ASD(C) memo "requires the R&D NIF activities
to implement the use of stabilized direct labor manday rates.,
and that "NAVMAT will convene a laboratory workshop sometime
in February to develop the approach which the labs will take
in implementing this part of the Rate Stabilization Policy."
[Ref. 21] The ASD(C) memo which the above letter referred
to was carefully reviewed and no mention or reference was
made to manday or other types of rate implementation methods,
or procedures which should be used.
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The meeting to discuss various aspects of rate stabil-
ization was held in Washington, D. C. , 11 and 12 February
1976. At this meeting it was pointed out that "...the stabil-
ized direct labor rate for fiscal year 1978 must be established
by August 1976 and could not be changed thereafter except by
direct authorization from OSD. OSD has indicated that when
these rates are stabilized in August 1976, (there is not to
be) any allowance for inflation or pay raises between August
1976 and the fiscal year 1978 time frame that they address."
The writer of the memo predicted that if the rates were set
with "complete honesty and perfect foresight" the Navy labora-
tories as a whole, would be guaranteed to have operating
losses of $35-40 million dollars during fiscal year 1978
given current inflation and pay-raise increases. [Ref. 22]
The laboratories were to implement the direct labor
stabilized rates as soon as possible, but most of the Comp-
trollers of the laboratories felt that the earliest date that
full implementation could be achieved would be 1 October 19 76.
The time between the February meeting and the 1 October imple-
mentation date would be needed to determine how the stabilized
rate structure could be most efficiently built into or added
to the data processing and reporting system. The laboratories
were directed to make a formal input to CNM indicating when,
how, and how soon implementation of stabilized rates could
be achieved.
A review of the correspondence in which the labora-
tories outlined their proposals for implementation indicated
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that direct labor and overhead rates would be assigned at
the cost center level. If distortions between actual costs
and stabilized rate costs were too great at the cost center
level then the rates would be assigned at a lower level within
the cost center so affected. The laboratories intended to
maintain their already developed system of accounting and
reporting and add new accounts as necessary to accommodate
the stabilized rate system with its associated variance
accounts.
4 . Budgeting for Inflation
The problem of not being able to budget for inflation
and pay increases was officially protested in a letter sent
from the Naval Weapons Center to the Chief of Naval Material.
The protest read as follows:
The Naval Weapons Center would like to go on
record as being opposed to the guidance. . .dealing
with the policy of not budgeting for inflation.
The present budgeting cycle is such that we will
continually be two years behind in adjusting the
direct labor rates for inflation. This translates
to a deficiency of approximately $9,000,000 in
the Direct Labor Rate Variance Account of NWC by
30 September 1978 and will continue in subsequent
years. It is felt that these losses will con-
stitute a reflection on the management of the
laboratories and will ultimately signal the
demise of the Industrial Fund. [Ref. 23]
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) re-
solved the issue of not being able to budget for known or
expected increases in labor and overhead costs by providing
guidance which suggested that costs for Direct Labor could
be increased by 5% for fiscal year 1977 and 8% for fiscal
year 1978. The budget for overhead costs could be increased
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8% for both fiscal year 1977 and fiscal year 1978. A further
adjustment to the budgeted fiscal year 1978 rates was allowed
to offset estimated gains or losses from fiscal years 1976
and 1977. [Ref. 24]
C. R&D LABORATORY INTERVIEWS
Interviews were conducted with individuals working in
finance, budget, or comptroller offices at five Naval Material
Command Research and Development Laboratories, to determine
the local impact of stabilized rates. The implementation
of stabilized rates was also discussed with personnel in two
Public Works Centers and the Comptroller of the Military Sea-
lift Command, Pacific. Interviews were scheduled by means
of telephone calls and were conducted in the offices of the
individuals being interviewed. The questions which were asked
were written down by the interviewers prior to the talks and
were of a general nature. The conversations at NUC, NELC,
NWC, MSCPAC, and the PWC * s were tape recorded. The interviews
were generally forty-five minutes to one hour in length. All
of the people being interviewed were open and willing to
answer any questions pertinent to the subject area. The
atmosphere was generally informal and friendly.
Interviews in the Washington, D. C. area were conducted
by Mr. Solberg. Interviews in the San Diego area were con-
ducted by Lieutenant Commander Kramar. Interviews at NWC,





The attitudes of the individuals being interviewed
toward the concept of rate stabilization were generally nega-
tive. The major reasons for opposing the concept are sub-
stantially the same as those pointed out earlier in this
chapter, and are summarized as follows. 1. The very nature
of research work is such that a product is not guaranteed
for a fixed number of dollars, rather a fixed number of dollars
is allocated to a project and the project is worked on until
the money is spent or the research is complete. A stabilized
rate for direct labor, labor acceleration, and overhead will
not change the nature of the work being performed. 2. Only
DOD sponsored projects would be billed at the stabilized
rates. All other sponsors would still be required to pay
actual costs for work performed. 3. This difference in
costing projects necessitates maintaining the old system of
collecting actual costs for billing non-DOD customers, and
adding accounts as necessary to establish a stabilized rate
billing system for all DOD customers. 4. Variance accounts
would have to be established to keep track of the differences
between the billed costs and the actual costs of the projects.
At the time of the interviews the laboratories had
not yet started the actual reprogramming effort which would
be required to implement the new billing system. Personnel
at all of the installations felt that the reprogramming effort
would be complete by the 1 October 1976 deadline. The cost




NUC - $15,000 [Ref. 30]
NELC - $100,000 [Ref. 29]
NWC - $70,000 [Ref. 31]
NSRDC - "Not too much" [Ref. 32]
NSWC - "Don't really know, but not critical" [Ref. 33]
• The estimates that were projected were acknowledged
to be only "rough guesses" and the actual cost of implemen-
tation could not be determined until reprogramming and debug-
ging were completed. NUC and NELC indicated that contract .
programmers would be used and that their labor was the item
most easily measured in terms of cost. The measurable costs
of maintaining the system after implementation were not
expected to increase significantly. The implementation of
the stabilized rate system is feasible from a computer program-
mer's standpoint.
2. Impact on Laboratory Management
The area which appears to provide the most dissatis-
faction, with regard to stabilized rates, is that of management
flexibility. The objectives of the Industrial Fund activities
are described in DOD Directive 7410.4, (September 25, 1972).
According to this directive the Industrial Funds are designed
to "Provide to managers of industrial and commercial-type
activities the financial authority and flexibility required
to procure and use manpower, materials and other resources
effectively." (Paragraph V.A.3) In addition this directive
states that a specific objective is "To establish and use
realistic cost standards as targets rather than detailed
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cost limitations." (Paragraph 5.B.6) The directive generally
emphasizes the requirement that local managers have the author-
ity and responsibility for the overall operations of the local
activity. During the interviews one individual stated that
the "value of NIF is that management has responsibility for
overall operation. . . stabilized rates take away one area of
flexibility that management should retain." [Ref. 29]
In the past, local management had the authority to
periodically change the rate at which overhead was charged
to the laboratory customers. These rate changes were gen-
erally minor and were done to insure a zero gain or loss in
the corpus of the fund. Direct labor and overhead at Naval
Weapons Center represents 52% of a total budget of approxi-
mately $206 million (FY 76) or $107 million. Since the NWC
corpus is two million dollars, an error of less than two
percent in forecasting direct labor and overhead costs for
a budget year which will end two years in the future could
double or eliminate the working capital of the activity.
While the operating results of a single activity may not
affect the Industrial Fund as a whole, the manager of NWC
has expressed the fear that potential losses "...will constitute
a reflection on the management of the laboratories..." [Ref. 21]
The Commander of the Naval Weapons Center stated in
a presentation to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Finan-
cial Management) : "My view is that Fiscal Integrity and Fiscal
Accountability must be imposed uniformly on all Laboratory
Commanders. BUT they must be allowed FISCAL FLEXIBILITY to
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to make the best possible decisions to accomplish their
assigned missions." [Ref. 42] The individuals interviewed
at the various Research and Development activities expressed
similar views.
3. Long Run Survival
The individuals interviewed did not feel that the
nature of the work performed at the R&D laboratories would
change significantly or that the laboratories themselves
would eventually cease to exist. It was however pointed out
that the Navy Industrial Fund is an accounting system which
could be compared with appropriation accounting or the
Resources Management System (RMS) . The managers at the NIF
activities feel that the NIF system is the best one to use
in the laboratories and that the system will continue to




The areas of planning and budgeting with the inclusion
of stabilized rates appeared to present the most concern. The
experience of rapidly increasing costs during the past several
years has increased the difficulty of accurately projecting
or predicting the cost of operations up to two years in advance
The Naval Undersea Center (NUC) provides an example
of the difficulties with rate stabilization. The rates which
NUC will use for FY 77 are based on the A-ll budget which was
submitted one year ago. NUC has recently been notified that
utility costs for FY 77 will increase from $.9 million to
$1.5 million. The utility costs for FY 77 will nearly double
due to a general increase in utility rates which the Public
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Works Center (PWC) San Diego, was not allowed to pass on since
it was required to stabilize rates in FY 76. The activity
may be able to absorb the increased utility costs, but if all
other factors were predicted with exact precision, the activity
could realize a $700 thousand operating loss from the increased
utility costs alone. [Ref. 34]
Another factor which complicates the budgeting process
is that many of the projects which are worked on at the labora-
tories are subject to annual Congressional appropriations.
The Congressional appropriations process does not occur until
after the budgets of the activities have been submitted. The
projection of the number and size of projects at any given
activity has a significant impact on predicted budgets and
rates.
5. Corpus
Historically, the activities have budgeted to maintain
a zero gain or loss in the local NIF corpus. During the course
of a year, small adjustments in overhead rates might be made
to maintain the corpus at a zero gain or loss. Those inter-
«
viewed generally agreed that over a period of years the
corpus could be maintained since operating gains or losses
in one year will be used as an adjustment factor for the
following years. It was pointed out however, that significant
underabsorption of costs could present cash flow problems
because the corpus at most of the activities is about one
percent of the total operating budget. [Ref. 29] According
to the correspondence reviewed, the activities can request
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OSD approval for a transfer of funds to maintain a favorable
cash balance in the local corpus. One individual commented,
"The feeling at the DOD level seems to be, if the corpus as
a whole is O.K., then the individual field activities don't
have to worry." [Ref. 31]
6. Legal Implications
The legality of implementing a system which could
result in corpus losses with the intent of recovering losses
in a succeeding fiscal year was questioned by some of the
local activity managers. Title 31 United States Code, para-
graph 628, Revised Statute 3678 reads, "Except as otherwise
provided by law, sums appropriated for the various branches
of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely
to the objects for which they are respectfully made, and •
for no others." [Ref. 8] It might appear that a possible
violation could be incurred because large prior-year losses
would be recovered using appropriations intended for current-
year work. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management) answered this by saying:
The provisions of R.S. 3678 relate to the application
of appropriated funds to the purposes for which they
were made. To the extent that customers use their
funds for the purposes authorized, e.g., air frame
repair, the statute would not be violated, notwith-
standing the fact that costs charged to the customers
by the industrial activity include a factor con-
sidered necessary to compensate for prior years'
losses. [Ref. 25]
There has also been concern that the provisions of
Title 31 United States Code, Section 665 (R.S. 3679) would
be violated. This statute reads in part:
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No officer or employee of the United States shall
make or authorize an expenditure from or create
or authorize an obligation under any appropriation
or fund in excess of the amount available therein;
nor shall any such officer or employee involve
the Government in any contract or other obligation
for the payment of money for any purpose, in advance
of appropriations made for such purpose, unless
such contract or obligation is authorized by law . .
.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, all
appropriations or funds available for obligation
for a definite period of time shall be so apportioned
as to prevent obligation or expenditure thereof in
a manner which would indicate a necessity for defi-
ciency or supplemental appropriations for such
period. . . [Ref . 9]
With regard to R.S. 3679, ASD(C) has implied that a
violation would not be incurred as long as the industrial
fund as a whole did not go broke. Mr. Miller of NUC explained
that R.S. 3679, "applies only to the extent that a funding
document for $10,000 cannot be billed $11, 000 ... Running the
corpus out of money is not a 3679 violation but is strongly
frowned upon..." [Ref. 30]
7. Stabilized Rates as a Planning Aid
As a planning aid the stabilized rate policy is of
most use to the customers of the activities since they will
know in advance how many hours of effort their dollars will
buy. In the research area however, it may not be known how
many hours of effort will be required to achieve a solution
to a research problem. The Comptroller of NELC explains,
"There is still no way to give an absolute dollar cost to a
particular development project. An estimate can be made, but
if more labor hours are required than were estimated, either
work stops or more money is made available." [Ref. 29]
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There was a consensus that the NIF process will not
change and that R&D activities will still attempt to budget
for a zero gain or loss, but for a three-year horizon. The
difference now is that the activities will be required to
bill their customers at the published rates.
8. Stabilized Rates as a Cost Distorting Factor
The individuals interviewed indicated that stabilized
rates as a cost distorting factor will be significant only to
programs which are small in terms of total manhours . The
larger projects utilize a wide enough range of talent that
cost center average costs closely approximate the actual cost
of the work done. A problem does exist if the projected
average costs for labor or overhead are significantly over
or under estimated. This would cause next years projects to
cost more (or less) because this years projects absorbed too
little (or too much) cost.
D. INTERVIEWS AT NON-R&D NIF ACTIVITIES
Interviews were conducted at the Public Works Center,
San Diego, (PWCSD) , Public Works Center, San Francisco Bay,
(PWCSF) , and the Military Sealift Command, Pacific, (MSCPAC)
to provide some information on activities with experience
using stabilized rates. The individuals interviewed were
the Assistant Division Director for Accounting at PWCSD, the
Comptroller at PWCSF, and the Comptroller at MSCPAC.
1. Public Works Centers
The Public Works Centers were required to implement
rate stabilization during fiscal Year 1976. Labor was charged
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at actual cost for the first seven months of the fiscal year,
and stabilized rates became effective 1 February 1976. Over-
head rates were frozen for all of fiscal year 19 76.
The cost of implementation was estimated to be not
more than $10,000 at PWCSD [Ref. 35] PWCSF estimated the
cost of implementation to be $100,000. [Ref. 36] These were
estimates for the cost of programming changes for the auto-
matic data processing system.
Both activities experienced losses on direct labor
after the rate was stabilized. PWCSD lost $100,000 for the
remainder of the fiscal year and PWCSF experienced a loss of
$30,000 per month. The major problem for both activities
has been the rapidly increasing cost of utilities. The inter-
viewee at PWCSD explained that "the Public Utilities Commis-
sion is very political which makes it hard to anticipate what
will happen. We used to be able to figure increases in utility
rates would be consistent with increases in wage rates and
fuel costs. This is not so anymore, the rate structure
changed so that rates for commercial users increased signifi-
cantly and homeowners rates were not appreciably affected.
A 19% system increase was a 40% PWC increase." [Ref. 35] The
40% increase in utility costs which PWCSD experienced led to
a need for a corpus augmentation of $2.5 million. The corpus
augmentation was not a shift of funds between activities but




The individuals interviewed at both activities felt
that the concept of rate stabilization was one which could
be lived with. Predicting utility changes was the one area
that both agreed would present the most problems.
a. Impact on Corpus
With regard to the expected impact on the corpus
of the activities the long run results will even out gains
and losses. While PWCSD was the first Public Works Center
to project significant losses the PWCSD interviewee stated,
"Even though PWCSD is more in the red than other activities,
we are also closer to breaking even than other activities.
The crunch will come in two or three years because fore-
casting is very difficult. Since there is a two year lag in
recovering underabsorbed costs, this may cause a whiplash
effect on the rates which will be charged." [Ref. 35] While
PWCSD required the corpus augmentation, PWCSF reported oper-
ating gains of $630,000. Part of the gain was offset by
prior year losses of $260,000. [Ref. 36] Public Works
Centers have been exempted from the requirement to use
stabilized rates for material.
b. Cost Controls
At PWCSF each department is responsible for plan-
ning its own budget. The targeted budget and actual costs
are reviewed quartly. The variances which occur are reviewed
only at the higher levels of management. Management pressures
are applied to stay within budgeted costs. The objective is
to break even or be within one percent of the total budget.
Costs are collected at actual cost then converted to stabilized
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rates which are used to bill the customers on a bi-monthly
basis. Variances are collected on a job order or customer
order basis and then aggregated to show the total labor or
overhead variance. [Ref. 36]
PWCSD was using rates which were set at the
lowest level within each cost center. This resulted in the
use of approximately one hundred different rates for direct
labor. Fewer rates would be more appropriate and PWCSD will
probably start a policy of setting rates according to the
basic trades (carpenters, metal workers, etc.). PWCSD
accumulates variances for each predetermined rate and aggregates
those variances into one account for a total direct labor
variance. The customer billing process has remained the
same except that the rates on the bills are now stabilized
rates. [Ref. 35]
Neither of the Public Works Centers appear
to utilize the accumulated variances for cost control at the
lower levels of management. They appear to be collected
primarily for statistical and reporting purposes,
c. Impact on Customer Planning
The major benefit of utilizing stabilized rates
is that the customers of the Public Works Centers will be
able to accurately budget maintenance, upkeep, and utility
costs. Both of the individuals interviewed felt that the
customers were happy with the policy of fixed rates. As was
pointed out, "Instead of having fifty different San Diego
activities asking for budget variances, it ' s better to have
one activity asking for a variance. From the customer point
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of view it's very attractive." [Ref. 35] Since in-year rate
changes have been eliminated, the long run. accounting work
for both the users and providers of services might be re-
duced. [Ref. 36]
d. Advice to Activities Implementing Stabilized
Rates
If an activity is switching to a stabilized rate
system the major emphasis should be placed on having an
accurate cost data base. Implementation was considered to
be no problem if the financial system is up to date and the
data is accurate. [Ref. 36] One interviewee stated, "Good
cost data is necessary. .. if fluctuations can be traced, then
rates can be better controlled or predicted." [Ref. 37]
2 . Military Sealift Command
The Military Sealift Command has had more experience
with rate stabilization than any of the other activities
where interviews were conducted. MSCPAC operates as a divi-
sion of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) . The operating
results which are depicted in Appendix C are for the MSC as
a whole and not of MSCPAC. It should be noted that, except
for the last three years, MSC has generally come to within
2-1/2% of the budget predictions. [Ref. 37] MSC implemented
stabilized rates in fiscal year 1974. After implementation,
MSC operating results showed a loss of $78 million in FY 74,
which was offset by a gain of $86 million in FY 75 through
rate adjustment. These fluctuations were primarily due to
unanticipated fuel price increases. Fluctuations have con-
tinued to be high since FY 75.
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The cash allocation (corpus) of MSC is $100 million
and operating revenues for FY 7 6 were programmed to be approxi-
mately one billion dollars. [Ref. 26] It should be noted that
the MSC corpus represents approximately ten percent of the
operating budget while the corpus of the R&D activities
represents approximately one percent of the operating budget.
a. Operating Environment
Due to the nature of its operation, MSC is sig-
nificantly affected by world economic conditions. Fuel prices
and the cost of repairs in foreign ports are generally higher
than they might be if the ships were operated and repaired
from a single facility. If a ship is damaged in a foreign
port the repair costs may be three times as much as would be
expected if the repairs could be made in the home ports.
MSC is the only area in civil service which allows people to
be paid more than civil service ceilings. The civilian
captains 1 starting salaries are approximately $62 thousand
per year working six months on duty and six months off duty.
[Ref. 37]
Commander Leals of the MSC emphasized the importance
of cost controls several times with particular emphasis placed
on being able' to trace costs.
b. Comments on Stabilized Rates
Commander Leals had a positive attitude toward
the concept of stabilized rates saying, "Stabilized rates
are the only way to go. Our operations don't cease on 30
June and we need the longer term planning horizon of three
to five years. We do need to be accountable for a specific
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period of time as a measuring device and the fiscal year is
a good measuring device, but the business is an ongoing
business and a longer term is needed for planning." [Ref. 37]
He also commented that fixed rates make budgeting much easier
for the users of the industrial fund activities. As a general
comment Commander Leals stated:
"You have to sell the higher echelons...
on the fact that revenue fluctuations
of a severe magnitude may occur depend-
ing on the world economic situation...
You need to have people at the Secretarial
and Congressional levels understand what
the implications of fixed rates are...
you have to be able to justify why a gain
or loss has occurred, but the mere fact
of a great gain or loss is not of concern
as long as there is sufficient justification





Chapter IV addresses the questions of causal factors
leading to stabilized rates in the Naval R&D laboratories
and the logical consequences of such a policy on management.
This chapter first examines the linkage of casual factors
behind the thrust of fixed rates. Secondly it looks at the
consequences of the policy in terms of (1) impact upon the
laboratory management process, (2) impact upon the accounting
process and (3) impact upon the external, i.e., the customer
structure. The forward-looking portion of Chapter IV is
based upon assumptions concerning unresolved details in the
application of stabilized rates and what constitutes rational
responses by key actors in the organizational systems. Both
technical accounting analyses and organizational theory are
generally avoided. The focus of this chapter is the inter-
face and the reciprocal impact between accounting systems
and the management process.
B. CASUAL FACTORS LEADING TO STABILIZED RATES
From a short-term, practical standpoint, a discussion
of casual factors is academic. The Navy Laboratories have
been directed to proceed forthwith in instituting stabilized
rates. To the extent adoption of the policy is a settled
issue, coping strategies become more important than policy
evaluation, at least at the level of laboratory management.
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From the standpoint - of this thesis, however, the reasons
behind the policy change become important.
Stabilized rates were not imposed on Navy Laboratories
because of factors peculiar to the laboratories themselves.
It appears rather that the policy was justified as a more
"macro" level, treating all NIF activities as a single class.
Through the invocation of procedural uniformity, adoption of
stabilized rates was required of all NIF activities including
Navy Laboratories. The two stage effect — justifying fixed
rates for all NIF activities and then forcing fixed rates
to fit the R&D situation — is the overview best explaining
the presence of fixed rates at the laboratories today.
Among the interviewees, there was a high degree of con-
sensus as to the casual factors perceived to underlie stabil-
ized rates at industrially funded activities. The respondents
also believed that the policy was an outgrowth of interaction
between DOD, OMB, and Congress. The two reasons most fre-
quently cited in the laboratory interviews for the impetus to
stabilize rates were:
1. To make it possible for operational users of indus-
trially-funded activities to execute plans in the
face of spiraling inflation.
2. To encourage better management at industrially- funded
activities.
Comments transmitted under the signature of Mr. G. D. Penisten,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management) tend




1. What is the main purpose of rate stabilization?
The main purpose of rate stabilization is to
execute the budgeted program and to eliminate
perturbations in the budgeted program. ... A
concomitant objective of rate stabilization
is to improve customer planning which, in
turn, should improve work scheduling at NIF
activities. The resultant stability in work-
load and workforce should permit increased
economies and efficiencies to be realized at
NIF activities. [Ref. 25]
The two purposes are not mutually exclusive. It is possible
that a policy change could be beneficial to the customer and
also contribute to better internal management. All evidence
indicates that stabilized rates were instituted mainly for
the industrial fund user.
Navy customers of industrially-funded activities are, in
fact, living with a budgetary crisis. Navy operational
commands have had to live with the problem of acute budget
shortfalls because of sharper than expected price increases.
This has been particularly true in O&MN (Operations and
Maintenance, Navy) Appropriations. These operational com-
mands are major customers at NIF activities in a user-producer
relationship. Classes of NIF activities which are used include
shipyards, public works center, air rework activities, and
research and development centers. Inflationary pressures,
particularly during the years 1971, 1972, and 1973 resulted
in frequent steep rate increases in prices NIF activities
charged their customers. The users had the painful choice
of seeking budget augmentation or settling for reductions in
work accomplished. All too often it was the latter. Intervals
between overhauls were lengthened. Repair work was cut back.
50

Minimum standards were temporarily abandoned. An alarming
"bow wave" of unmet maintenance needs was created. The fol-
lowing example illustrates the Navy's problem:
Example: In the past, the Operation and
Maintenance, Navy appropriation could budget
for 95 ship overhauls based on a planned
number of man-days for each individual ship
at a specific shipyard, using that yard's
current man-day rate. This would generate
a total budget of say $900 million. No cost
escalation was allowed to be added to the
0&M,N budget. Therefore, when the ships
actually came into the yards (about 1 to
1-1/2 years after the budget formulation)
,
the 0&M,N customer found the yards charging
higher man-day rates because of actual
experience for costs of labor, material,
utilities, etc., and instead of getting
95 overhauls for the $900M, the Fleet
could only overhaul 85 ships. This tended
to push an increasingly large bow-wave of
required overhauls into the future and
degrade the readiness of the Fleet. [Ref. 25]
An obvious approach to the problem would be to add contin-
gency or "Fudge" factors to the various operational budgets
based upon forecasted inflation rates. Budgets would be more
realistic in terms of resources available. Budget execution
would more closely track budget planning. Indeed provisions
for inflation are currently included in some budget line items,
Most procurement appropriation budgets contain provisions for
general civil service increases of 5% since the Federal Pay
Bill of 1972 prescribed the timing and basis for general
schedule wage increases. Shipbuilding contracts, which are
multiyear, incorporate provisions to allow some relief from
inflation. Generally, however, the portion of 0&M,N budgets
for work to be performed by NIF commands has been inadequate
in anticipating price increases since pay raises and inflation
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were not permitted to be included prior to the FY 78 budget
submission.
The Office of Management and Budget has been reluctant
to allow operational commands to budget for forecasted rate
increases in the part of the budget earmarked for industrial
type work. Potential reasons for this reluctance include
the following:
1. It is politically awkward for an administration to
acknowledge expectations of high inflation in its
planning at the same time it is supposedly pursuing
policies to reduce the inflation rate.
2. Allowing a factor for inflation opens another poten-
tial for padding. This could work at cross-purposes
to the present climate for tightening-down on budget
abuses.
3. Allowing a factor for inflation, if not properly
controlled, could result in double budgeting. This
would happen when planners at two or more echelons
each add an inflation factor.
Out of reluctance to give more ground in the direction of
adding inflation contingencies to 0&M,N budgets, other alter-
natives were sought.
One emergent alternative was therefore to implement a
pricing policy of fixed rates by government industrial type
activities. DOD operational users could then draw up a plan
based upon known rates. A high rate of inflation will still
reduce what can be accomplished. However this scale-down
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would be reflected in the plan. Once the plan was approved,
performance should track very closely. Stabilized rates
would help operational units plan and, at the same time,
deprive them of one excuse for bad planning.
With stabilized rates the problem of uncertainty in in-
flation rates is still present but now the location has shifted,
The problem is transferred to industrially funded activities.
Errors in estimation become profits or losses to the indus-
trial fund. In a worst-case situation, one of the service
industrial funds would be exhausted. The worst case has
potential legal implications and, it should be emphasized,
need not happen.
It can be argued that the problem of inflation rate un-
certainty is better placed at industrially- funded activities.
Industrially funded activities have two inherent restraining
devices missing in other government environments. First,
errors in estimation will reflect themselves as profits or
losses to the fund. This is not infallible inasmuch as a
profit or loss is the net of all factors. Other factors
could mask error in inflation forecasting. Profit due to
overestimating inflation could offset some other operating
result so that a large plus and a large minus net out to a
small change. Nonetheless, profits and losses are still
variances susceptible to analysis. The second restraining
factor is that industrial type activities are susceptible to
price analysis. Published prices can be compared, in many
cases, to prices quoted by counterparts within the private
sector. There may be elements of non-comparability but again
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comparison of prices offers a ready-made variance. Changes
to the fund and price analysis both offer. (1) a source of
visibility facilitating oversight and (2) a potential market
place discipline tending to promote cost-consciousness. It
may be questionable how effectively these mechanisms do the
job but they are at least present in contrast to facilities
funded by allotment.
Assuming that a policy of stabilized rates is desirable
for most classes of industrial activities, should it be uni-
formly applied to all activities? As chronicled in Chapter
III, the Navy Laboratories responded rigorously in the negative.
Nevertheless, the policy was uniformly required of all NIF
activities including R&D.
Navy Laboratories are, because of the nature of research,
basically different from most industrially- funded government
activities. The output of a public works center, for example,
is a tangible product or service. Typically the processes
are highly standardized. Production costs can be accurately
determined by individual engineers and cost accountants.
Often the product is commercially available providing yet
another indication of a proper price. In contrast, the product
of a research and development center is unpredictable and
non-standard
.
Federal laboratory programs differ not only
in their particular distribution of activites
— ranging from basic research to specific
product development — but also in the
disciplinary mixture of their scientific
talent. This multiplicity of kinds of
scientific efforts makes it difficult to




Another aspect of Federal laboratory research
that challenges adequate definition is the
identity of either the immediate or long-term
benficiaries or users of an agency's R&D output.
In contrast to industrial R&D which is performed
for purposes of profit with readily identifiable
users, Federal R&D is intentionally oriented
toward tasks that the private sector cannot or
will not undertake, as well as tasks appropriate
to government undertaking in the national interest.
[Ref. 10, pp. i, ii]
Navy laboratories do have users in the sense that their NIF
sponsors, primarily the Naval Systems Commands, are end users.
The general problems of measuring laboratory output are present
in Navy laboratories.
In this situation, costs become surrogate measures for
output. Customers pay laboratories for a "best effort" rather
than a product. In this vein laboratories argued that fixing
the price of inputs, i.e., labor, was a meaningless drill since
the chief source of uncertainty was the quantity of input,
not the price. The laboratories further argued that in actual
practice, a customer would fund a laboratory to a certain level
and the laboratory would continue effort on the customer's
project until funds were exhausted. Therefore, stabilized
rates merely represented another overhead increasing exercise.
Nevertheless, requests by the Navy Laboratories for
waivers from the policy were rejected. In refusing to exempt
the laboratories, DOD did not make a persuasive case for
stabilized rates at Navy Laboratories in particular. The
gist of the rejoinder was that stabilized rates were a general
policy and the laboratories did not have a strong case for
exemption. This attitude is in a passage of a memo on the
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subject of rate stabilization from DOD to the Navy. The
memo reads, "While the gains to R&D activities from this
policy may not be as significant as with other activities,
we have not discerned that there would be any disadvantages
from their participation." [Ref. 20]
The entire stream of administrative correspondence stresses
the need for uniform implementation of stabilized rates. There
is a hint that if stabilized rates are not suitable for a
class of activities, industrial fund accounting is not suit-
able either as indicated by DOD in the following comment:
"As you know, the Senate Appropriations Committee has questioned
the inclusion of some activities under the industrial fund
unbrella. An exception to R&D activities may raise the
question as to whether or not the R&D activities should be
included in the industrial fund. Our conclusion at this time
that they should and although we recognize that there may be
some problems in implementation, they do not, in our opinion,
warrant exclusion from this new policy." [Ref. 20] As stabil-
ized rates evolved, the laboratories were impaled upon a neat
dilemma. Stabilized rates and NIF accounting became a pack-
age deal.
More fundamentally, insistence upon uniform implementation
coincides with a general trend to standardize and centralize.
Concurrent with stabilized rates, for example, the Navy is
actively pursuing a standardized, and more centralized,
civilian payroll system. Property management has been
centralized. Personnel administration has experienced in-
creased centralization. Whatever arguments are used to
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support changing to stabilized rates, the new policy is another
manifestation of the trend to standardize and centralize.
C. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
This section on implementation considerations deals
with the short-term strategies and problems associated with
putting stabilized rates into operation. Whatever the reasons
or the effects, the new policy is now mandatory. The die has
been cast. Laboratory personnel have to shift into an exe-
cution mode and make the required changes.
The eight NAVMAT laboratories offically began billing
using stabilized rates on October 1, 1976, the beginning of
fiscal year 1977. This thesis effort spans the start-up
period and permits comparison between anticipatory fears and
actual experience during the first three months. Initial
feedback indicates that the conversion has been relatively
smooth. The worst fears remain, to date, unrealized. This
tends to bear out the responses of laboratory interviews
which rated implementation problems to be of less concern
than the long range impact which stabilized rates would have
upon laboratory management. The apparent lack of difficulty
should not lead one to unduly minimize the task of changing
internal systems to a stabilized rate basis. Over the last
few years the laboratories have become experienced in adapting
their financial systems to externally-mandated changes.
Experience in system-changing undoubtedly made this last
change easier. Secondly, problems may have not yet surfaced.
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The work of implementation can be logically segragated
into two kinds of activity. The first is the budget or plan-
ning task of initially setting the rates. The second is the
specialized task of changing computer programs and accounting
procedures. The two areas require different skills and are
oriented in different directions. However, close coordination
is required between the budget activity of rate-setting and
the systems analysis task of modifying an automated financial
system. In recognition of this need all five laboratories
interviewed had established ad hoc task groups possessing
inter-disciplinary skills to oversee the change. Despite
initial opposition to stabilized rates, each of the labora-
tories visited appeared to be mobilizing their financial skills
to make stabilized rates work.
Discussions and preliminary analysis of rate-setting
methodology had been going on since the Navy laboratories
first received an inkling of the high probability that R&D
activities would not receive a waiver from the stabilized
rate requirement. Considerable uncertainty existed as to how
many rates a laboratory could have, what the basis for dif-
ferent rates would be and what provision, if any, could be
made for inflation. By mid-1975, many of the uncertainties
had been resolved. Most of the methodology is contained in
paragraph 3 of NAVMATNOTE 7600 [Ref. 27], which restates the
basic NAVCOMPT Instruction for the NAVMAT laboratories.
3. Policy
a. Each activity operating under the provisions
of reference (a) will establish rates which may be
expressed as costs per manhour, manday, or unit of
output. An activity may have as many rates as
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approved in advance by the activity's group manager.
Rates will be in consonance with the budgeting and
accounting practices and procedures as presented in
reference (a) . Each approved composite rate will
encompass all overhead costs, labor acceleration
and direct labor. Rates will not cover direct
material, direct travel, nor direct contractual
services. In order to minimize profits or losses
in the Navy Industrial Fund corpus, billing rates
will be proposed in the annual NIF A-ll budgets
submitted to OSD based on the premise that all
anticipated costs in the budget year will be re-
covered by the proposed rates. Upon approval by
OSD, rates established in compliance with this
notice are expected to remain in effect throughout
the budget fiscal year. Therefore, activities will
change neither individual component nor composite
rates without higher authority approval. Requests
for rate . changes shall be submitted via chain of
command with appropriate justification. OSD has
indicated that rate changes will be approved only
when continuing losses threaten the viability of
the Defense Industrial Fund as a whole.
b. Approved rates will be used in providing
federal sponsors with budgetary estimates for work
to be performed.
c. Approved rates will be used to bill all
DOD customers (sponsors) for work performed and
services rendered on the basis of accepted cost
reimbursement orders with the exception of reim-
bursable orders citing programs that are not subject
to normal overhead distributions, e.g., Family
Housing. Exempted reimbursable orders will be billed
in accordance with current procedures.
d. Approved fiscal year rates will be used to
bill all DOD customers for work or services per-
formed within that fiscal year regardless of when
billed.
e. Work performed and services rendered on the
basis of accepted fixed price orders will be billed
the fixed price amount in accordance with procedures
in reference (a) . However, the amount of fixed price
orders will be negotiated on the basis of the rates
established in compliance with subparagraph 3. a.
above
.
f. Work performed and services rendered for non-
DOD customers of industrially funded activities are
not included under the subject program. These cus-
tomers will, therefore, continue to be billed for
actual costs incurred in accordance with current
procedures.
g. Approved rates will be used to bill direct
costs to all DOD customers (users) for work performed
or services rendered by industrially- funded Test and
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Evaluation activities operating under the DOD
uniform funding policy for Major Ranges and
Test Facilities. Non-DOD customers will be
billed actual costs in accordance with current
procedures. Indirect cost (overhead) will
continue to be charged to institutional support,
RDT&E category 6.5, and will be based on accrued
costs incurred, not on approved rates.
Prior to mid-19 76 two out of the three components of
stabilized rates were in effect already set. The laboratories
had been directed to freeze G&A and indirect overhead in mid-
FY 1976 in response to headquarters guidance. Another com-
ponent, acceleration for payroll benefits, was relatively
stable. What remained to be done was to determine the number
of direct labor rates each laboratory would use and the set-
ting of each direct labor rate.
The laboratories interviewed all believed that it was
highly important to set an appropriate rate initially. An
appropriate rate would be defined, in this context, as one
in which changes to the corpus are small, i.e., minimal
profits or losses. This arises from the belief that the
laboratories would not enjoy as much local discretion in
future rate setting as was enjoyed the first time around.
The basis for this concern is the concept of the group man-
ager. The basic NAVCOMPT Instruction [Ref . 11] , establishes
group managers for clusters of NIF activities. The group
manager administers the aggregate of the industrial funds
under his cognizance. The effect of this aggregation will
be to net out performance extremes within the manager's group
of activities. A loss at one activity may offset a profit
at another. The fear was expressed that rate-setting would
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be increasingly driven by aggregate trends. Industrial
activities would operate with partially-imposed rates not
properly reflecting local costs. The laboratories wanted to
make sure that rates were realistically set while the action
was still largely in their hands.
The second major implementation task is that of modifying
the financial systems - both the automated and manual portions
- to accommodate the new policy. Since financial systems at
the NAVMAT laboratories are highly computerized, much of the
task involves computer systems analysts and computer program-
mers. The quality of the implementation is dependent upon
how well the changes to be made are defined in advance.
Specific details of the changes are wedded to the ongoing
financial data processing systems operational at each of the
laboratories
.
At the time of the interviews, the inevitability of
stabilized rates had been accepted. The laboratories were
concentrating on systems definition. There was a high level
of confidence that the change to stabilized rates would be
smoothly accommodated.
D. IMPACT UPON LABORATORY MANAGEMENT
Some uncertainty 'surrounds the operation of the new policy,
because some results of stabilized or fixed rates depend upon
how the rates will be administered. Since the new policy has
just become operative, there is no data regarding the admin-
istration of rates, especially by group managers. Nevertheless,
it is considered that stabilized rates will have five major
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effects upon the laboratory community:
1. Modification of the planning process by quantum
increases in planning lead time and in the minimum
degree of planning precision required.
2. Changes in funding practices by customers.
3. Increases in the degree of vulnerability to
upheavals in the economy.
4. Transfer of some control from the laboratories to
headquarters
.
5. Increased conservatism by laboratory management.
1. Modification of Planning Process
Laboratories are finding that both lead time and
precision required in formulating performing budgets are
increased. The laboratories submit rates to the group manager
via the A-ll budget just prior to the fiscal year. However,
as a practical matter these rates will already have been the
subject of a negotiation process several months in advance.
It is also necessary to communicate the rates to customers
in advance. To arrive at rates earlier, the base data used
in calculating has to be estimated earlier. Respondents
in the laboratory interviews felt that planning lead time
would be extended by as much as one year. A corresponding
increase in the precision of budgeting is required. Histor-
ically, laboratories have formulated rough, long-lead perform-
ing budgets. These budgets were refined in iterative stages
as data firmed-up, resulting in the publication of a fairly
accurate document just prior to the execution phase, i.e.,
just prior to the new fiscal year.
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Longer lead time coupled with high precision require-
ments will have both positive and negative side effects. The
laboratories will have to do more genuine planning to develop
rates as accurately as possible. Better planning is certainly
a positive spill-off. On the other hand, once made, there
could be a tendency for rates to become self-fulfilling
objectives. In the worst-case situation, gaming of the system
could occur. There is a greater likelihood that management
will transact its business with one eye on how the rates are
working out. This syndrome need not be overt or conscious.
To the extent that preoccupation with breaking-even detracts
from pursuit of basic goals, this has to be considered a
negative side-effect.
2. Changes in Funding Practices
Actual funding practices by principal laboratory
sponsors may not be compatible with the long-lead fixed rates.
This issue is raised in a position paper written at one of
the large Naval Laboratories..
....In spite of our best planning efforts, the
budgets for individual projects fluctuate throughout
the budget and even the current fiscal years. Often
we do not know the final funding picture until late
in the fiscal year. [Ref. 43]
The paper then notes that laboratories tend to receive sponsor
funding at the last minute and adds:
In many cases individual projects are working on
a hand-to-mouth basis. Long range planning and
rate stabilization become difficult under these
circumstances
.
RDT&E is a dynamic program, subject to shifting
priorities at the Systems Command and CNO level.
Projects are accelerated, slowed down, or cancelled
on short notice. At times, we feel the laboratories
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are used as surge tanks to accommodate excess
fund availability on the part of our customers
or even as a source of funds when contracts
overrun. In many cases a Work Request is not
treated as a contract with a laboratory. It is
treated as a level of effort program subject to
change at the whim of a program manager at
headquarters. [Ref. 43]
The foregoing suggests that actual funding practices
may vary from the official , classroom perception. To the
extent this is true, informal agreements between sponsor
and laboratory play a large roll in planning. Funding
practices by laboratory customers is an interesting subject,
perhaps a good thesis topic in itself. It is outside the
scope of this thesis to evaluate funding practices except
as they impinge on stabilized rates. However, with the
addition of another laboratory management constraint in the
form of stabilized rates, volatile funding patterns will be
less acceptable.
3. Increase in Vulnerability to Economic Upheaval
All NIF activities, Navy laboratories included, are
more vulnerable to upheavals in the economic environment
under fixed rates. This vulnerability is illustrated by the
experience of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) during the
oil embargo of late 1973. MSC is an industrially funded
Naval Activity which both leases and operates merchant ships
on behalf of a wide variety of DOD customers. Operating
results, i.e. , the net changes to the corpus are shown in
Appendix C. From 1950 through the early seventies, operating
results hovered near the break-even point. In 1974 MSC
experienced an unprecedented 78 million dollar loss. As a
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consequence rates were raised for 1975 resulting in an 86
million dollar profit. [Ref. 44] The 1974 loss is associated
with steep increases in fuel costs stemming from the oil
embargo. While the MSC would have experienced a loss because
of unprecedented changes in fuel costs in any case, the mag-
nitude was much greater because rates were frozen. Otherwise,
MSC could have initiated a series of rate increases through-
out the fiscal year. In accordance with NAVCOMPT Instruction
7600.23 [Ref. 11], MSC raised its rates the following year
to recoup the deficit. Oscillations of profits and losses
are a logical outgrowth of severe changes in costs under
fixed rates. In such a situation, rates remain constant
within a year but fluctuate more between years. Given econ-
omic upheavals, the fluctuations shown by Appendix C are
not necessarily the most undesirable of various possibilities.
The fluctuations shown are, however, predictable at any NIF
activity under similar circumstances.
4 . Transfer of Some Control from Laboratories to
Headquarters
Another result of the new policy will be the migration
of responsibility and control to headquarters echelons. There
is nothing innate in the concept of fixed rates which should
diminish control at local NIF activities. However a collateral
ingredient of the new policy is responsible for this result.
This ingredient is the key role of the group activity corpus
manager. The role of the group commander is established by
paragraph 3 of the basic NAVCOMPT Instruction which reads
in part as follows:
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....The activity group commander will approve the
number, and kind of rates to be established based
on each activity's organizational structure,
diversity of workload and other management con-
siderations. Stabilized rates submitted by the
activities will be reviewed and adjusted by the
activity group manager, to provide the necessary
changes to offset the total prior year gains or
losses, thereby achieving zero profit and loss
in the Accumulated Operating Result Accounts of
the activity group. Gains and losses will
normally be fully offset during the year fol-
lowing their occurrence and will be reflected
uniformly in the rates of the activity group.
[Ref. 11]
The designation of group manager conforms to existing organi-
zational patterns. For the eight NAVMAT laboratories, the
group manager is MAT 035 in the Office of the Chief of Navy
Material. The wording of the basic instruction clearly says
that it is MAT 035 which is a control point and not each of
the component laboratories. By implication the setting of
rates at a specific laboratory can be affected by factors
that have nothing to do with the laboratory itself. A specific
laboratory can be affected by the financial status of other
laboratories. This is noted in a question and answer attach-
ment to memorandum signed by Mr. G. D. Penisten, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management) which says,
"The current policy of distributing a pay back rate uniformly
to all activities within an industrial group could very well
result in an individual activity perpetuating an operating
loss indefinitely." [Ref. 25] Mr. Penisten then adds that
this feature is under review within the Navy. However, until




An interesting aspect of centralizing pricing author-
ity is that it potentially paves the way for a total change
in price philosophy. Even though "group managers" control
rates, each laboratory still has a set of rates based upon
its own costs. Although profits at one laboratory may be
used to offset losses at another to maintain the group corpus,
rates remain dependent upon cost factors at individual lab-
oratories. The mechanism of a group manager could permit the
evolution of one standard rate for all Navy laboratories,
nationwide. Differences in costs between laboratories would
then reflect themselves as inter-laboratory variances which
should net out to zero in the aggregate.
5. Increasingly Conservative Behavior by Management
The effect of fixed rates controlled at a higher
organizational level will put pressure on laboratory manage-
ment to behave conservatively. Operating under externally
managed rates represents yet one more local constraint.
Failure to achieve a break-even point creates unwanted visi-
bility. The prevailing climate on this issue is revealed
in the Question and Answer attachment to a memo by the Assist-
ant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management) which reads
as follows:
Does not the implementation of this procedure
represent an apparent departure from the long
established principle that control of industrial
fund operation is vested at the activity group
level?
No. Management will be held accountable for
losses resulting from operations. The local
activity managers should be prepared to explain
all losses in terms of pay raise cost variance,
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material cost variance and other such specific
terms. The term rate stabilization is a general
term and will not be considered adequate to
explain the specific variances that caused the
gain or loss. OSD has directed that rate stabil-
ization be implemented as a means to eliminate
perturbations in the budgeted program. [Ref. 25]
Rates are developed on a long-lead time basis and the element
of uncertainty is very high. If the rate is grossly in error,
whether caused by events or calculation error — permission
for a mid-year change must be obtained from OSD. The admin-
istrative correspondence strongly advises that such petitions
are not encouraged. The new policy as currently structured
insures that the laboratory manager will be scrutinized and
judged if his rates generate variances. The conclusion is
that variances are not career enhancing . It logically follows
that managers will be biased, perhaps unconsciously, in favor
of courses of action which minimize the probability of large
variances. This bias may not be undesirable in itself. It
does not, however, relate to the basic missions of the lab-
oratories .
E. ACCOUNTING ASPECTS
Accounting, under stabilized rates, becomes somewhat
more complicated". Project costs can be expressed either on
an actual basis or on a stabilized rate basis. By establishing
two bases for expressing project costs, a new variance is
created.
Technically, under stabilized rates, incurred labor costs
are collected and recorded on an actual basis. It is the
revenue flows which are priced on the basis of stabilized
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rates. The difference becomes a variance. It is also one
of the components of net changes in the corpus.
Some of the correspondence refers to stabilized rates as
standard rates. They are not standard in the normal accounting
sense. This is an important reservation to bear in mind. In
accounting parlance "variance" is a word used in connection
with standard cost systems. The essence of a standard cost
system is the "should cost" concept.
The essential idea of a standard cost accounting
system is that costs and inventory amounts are
recorded at what costs should have been rather
than what they actually were. At some point in
the flow of costs through the system there is
a shift from actual costs to standard costs.
Wherever this shift occurs, a variance develops.
[Ref. 13, p. 398]
A standard or "should-cost" system is based upon industrial
engineering measurements of specific labor and machine oper-
ations . It is based upon physical quantities of input per
unit of output. Laboratories possess no output accounting
system. The basis of laboratory accounting is more accurately
characterized as level of effort.
Under stabilized rates, the net change to the corpus, i.e.,
profit or loss, may be broken down as follows:
1. Variance for prior year profits or losses.
2. Variance for external considerations (activity manager)
,
3. Variance for fringe benefits acceleration, high or low.
4. Variance for direct labor price, i.e., errors in pro-
jection.
5. Variance for overhead, over or under absorption.
Items 1 and 2 are administratively set. A variance in items
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3 or 4 is essentially forecasting error, but cannot be cor-
rected during the year at the activity level. Local managers
do not control fringe benefits for government employees.
Salaries are set by law. Hiring and layoffs are tightly
controlled. This leaves item 5 - overhead - as the only
variance which may be subject to managerial control. The
danger exists that management might attempt to work toward
the stabilized rate through manipulation of overhead. The
danger also exists that measurement of variances in the lab-
oratories will be overemphasized as a surrogate gimmick for
estimating laboratory productivity.
F. THE WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS
The majority of work performed by Navy Laboratories is
paid for out of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) funds. Navy laboratories are part of the weapons
procurement complex. In this respect Navy Laboratories
contrast with most other NIF activities whose customers are
primarily 0&M,N funded.
Respondents in laboratory interviews believed that stabil-
ized rates would have only a minimal effect upon their re-
lations with sponsors. Weapons systems projects typically
plan a certain level of effort at a laboratory. The end
project is to achieve a specific rung on the development
ladder or reach some go/no go decision point. Typically,
funding changes result in increases or decreases in the level
of effort. The factors in determining the level of effort
are rate times man-hours worked. Fixing the rate attaches
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certainty to only one of the two cost factors. The more
uncertain factor, the quantity of inputs needed to attain an
objective, remains relatively uncertain. This distinguishes
R&D from other NIF activities where labor inputs per unit of
output are predictable. This line of reasoning suggests that
stabilized rates alone will not offer comfort to RDT&E users
in the same measure as 0&M,N users.
Another possibility to be examined is whether stabilized
rates will result in some redistribution of program costs.
For example, one program may utilize GS-6 technicians at a
laboratory whereas another program utilizes GS-14 physicists.
Formerly, the second program would have been more costly than
the first to the extent that GS-14' s are costlier than GS-6's,
Under stabilized rates both projects would pay the same per
hour of effort. The project utilizing GS-14' s would be, in
effect, subsidized.
A statistical analysis by the Naval Weapons Center indi-
cates that this should not be a problem. A small, one or
two man laboratory effort may show substantially different
results between stabilized rates and actual costs, but with
larger efforts, the statistical effect of large samples take
effect. The mean labor rate for the project approaches the
mean rate for the organization. Situations where stabilized
rates cause distortions between programs will be rare.
If program managers were to bring undue pressure on lab-
oratories to assign highly-paid personnel (since they cost
the same as low-paid personnel) there are methods of counter-
ing the problem. First, different rates could be used for
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different salary brackets. One laboratory has structured
rates on a grade level basis. Second, low cost support per-
sonnel could become overhead costs. It would be unfortunate
if the issue of the grade level assigned to programs became
the subject of gamesmanship. No evidence of this has been
detected in the course of gathering material for this thesis.
It is suggested here that the probability of stabilized
rates directly affecting the weapons acquisition process,
positively or negatively, is minimal. To the extent that
stabilized rates result in behavior changes in the labora-
tories, there is a significant indirect effect.
G. CONCLUSION OF ANALYSIS
The issue of stabilized rates becomes part of a larger
issue as to how the Federal government is to be organized.
What degree of decentralization is optimal? What role does
divisionalization play in the Federal government?
Industrially funded activities are ambivalent organiza-
tions. On the one hand they are pseudo-commercial entities
within the government. On the other hand they are subject
to Federal statutory and administrative controls.
The Department of Defense outlines NIF objectives. The
first three objectives listed read as follows:
1. Provide a more effective means for controlling
the costs of goods and services required to
be produced or furnished by industrial and
commercial-type activities, and a more effective
and flexible means for financing, budgeting and
accounting for the costs thereof;
2. Create and recognize contractual relationships
between industrial and commercial-type activities
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and those activities which budget for and order
the end-products or services, in order to pro-
vide management advantages and incentives for
efficiency and economy;
3. Provide to managers of industrial and commercial-
type activities the financial authority and
flexibility required to procure and use man-
power, materials and other resources effectively.
[Ref. 3]
These objectives would seem to stress efficiency and cost
control rather than homogeneity and conformity. NIF activities
have always had to comply with all applicable regulations.
However, NIF managers, in certain areas, have had local dis-
cretion in how to comply. Present events give the appearance
of a trend toward centralization and standardization, a trend
which comes at the expense of the discretion and flexibility
left to the industrial manager.
In Divisional Performance: Measurement and Control [Ref.
14] , Solomons indicates that many corporations are highly
divisionalized. Divisional autonomy is encouraged up to a
point, in order to maximize profit. The degree of autonomy
varies. In some instances, divisions are free to engage in
fierce market competition. In other cases, most divisional
decisions are orchestrated at corporate headquarters.
When divisionalization does occur, some measure of divi-
sional performance is needed. The yardstick may be return
on investment, net profit, or a complex combination of
factors. [Ref. 15, pp. 395-410] The choice of measuring
device has some influence on behavior of divisional managers.
A manager maximizing return on investment can lease assets
in order to reduce the denominator of the ratio by which he
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is evaluated, thus improving his report card. Some divisional
performance considerations apply to the industrial fund man-
ager.
Industrial fund activities are pseudo divisions. They
buy resources and sell to customers in a producer-user rela-
tionship. However, industrial fund activities are not supposed
to have extensive profits or losses and their customers are
other government activities. The industrial fund manager
finds surrogate measures of performance — cost control,
volume, service quality, etc. These should not be derogated.
With good judgement, surrogate measures can be closely re-
lated to organizational mission.
Problems arise as new external constraints are added if
compliance with constraints becomes a measure of divisional
performance. When this happens, the basic purpose of the
organization is subordinated in the decision-making process.
The NIF process appears to imply a degree of divisional-
ization. Additional constraints make it more difficult to
pursue the industrial activity's basic purpose. Care must
be taken that an excellent record in conforming to the con-
straints does not become more important than optimum per-




The major conclusions of this thesis are as follows:
1. Customers of non-R&D NIF activities using stabilized
rates are benefited due to the improved budgeting capabilities
2. Non-R&D NIF activities already using stabilized rates
have made the transition to stabilized rates successfully.
3. The benefit to customers of R&D activities appears
to be minimal since most R&D is funded on a level of effort
basis.
4. NIF R&D activities can successfully manage under
stabilized rates. This success depends greatly on how rate-
setting is administered.
5. Rates should be carefully developed to reflect local
costs at each activity, with minimum adjustment at higher
levels.
6. An activity manager should not manipulate overhead
to minimize profit or loss. Measurement and control of over-
head expenditures is an appropriate end in itself.
7. A NIF manager's effectiveness should not be measured
principally by the size of variances incurred.
8. Rate manipulation is the least desirable means of
corpus management at the group manager's level. A management
strategy which emphasizes managerial accountability within
the activity and utilizes intra-corpus transfers is preferable
9. The possibility of incurring legal problems at the
activity level appears rather remote. The legal questions
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which have been raised concerning possible R. S. 3678 and
R. S. 3679 violations do not appear to be of a serious nature
to the local activity managers
.
Rate stabilization is a dynamic on-going process. The
final answer as to its success or failure can be determined
only after the policy has been fully implemented and the
actual results of several years of use are available. Another






Excerpted from Reference 12
Name and Location Mission
Naval Air Development
Center (NADC)























RDT^E center for Naval Aircraft Systems.
RDT5E center for the application of
science and technology associated with
military operations carried out
primarily in the coastal region and to
perform investigations in related fields
of science and technology.
Systems Engineering for Command Control
Telecommunications
.
RDT§E center for Ordnance Technology,
concepts and systems. Capabilities for
strategic systems, Naval mine systems,
multimedia weapons systems, fuse develop-
ment, inshore warfare ordnance, small
craft armament, swimmer weapons systems,
ordnance technology.
RDTSE center for Naval vehicles and to
provide RDT§E support to the U. S.
Maritime administration and the maritime
industry.
RDTSE center for undersea surveillance,
advanced surface and air launched under-
sea weapons systems, and deep ocean
technology.
RDTSE center for underwater combat systems









RDT§E center for warfare analysis, systems
integration, and fleet engineering sup-





To conduct a broadly based multidisciplinary
program of scientific and advanced tech-
nological development directed toward
new and improved materials, equipment,
techniques, systems, and related oper-
ational procedures for the Navy.
NOL and NWL have been administratively combined and are now the Naval
Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) , White Oak, Maryland.
>
"All of the Laboratories listed report to Chief of Naval Material with the




LABORATORIES - SIZE 5 BUDGET
Excerpted from Reference 12
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2916 llll < $23° for fy ^
NSRDC 2895 $119.6 $2.0
NUC 1645 $77.9 ($90.0 for FY 76) $.75
NUSC 3325 $109.1
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